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Abstract 
Ideas of conditional inference have grown out of many different schools of 
statistical thought. The development of these ideas is traced, starting with some 
original ideas of Fisher. The influence of other researchers, such as Basu and 
Buehler, is also discussed. The development is traced to the present, through the 
work of Pierce and Robinson, to current work in conditional inference. 
-3-
1. Introduction 
The development of conditional inference has followed many paths. There are now a 
number of inferential methods that use this name. For example, the likelihood based 
methods of Hinckley (1983), or Cox and Reid (1986), are conditional inference methods. The 
attempt of Kiefer (1977), to merge conditional ideas with frequentist theory is also 
conditional inference. 
The one common factor in the different conditional inferences is the requirement for 
reasonable (coherent) post-data inference. That is, inferential statements made after the 
data have been seen should have some logical consistency. Another approach to conditional 
inference, one that gained structure through the work of Buehler ,(1959) and Robinson 
(1979a,b), provides an objective framework for assessing post-data validity. It is this version 
of conditional inference on which we will concentrate. 
The different versions of conditional inference have a common origin in ideas of Fisher. 
These ideas of Fisher are somewhat intuitive, and leave some gaps in development (but not 
to Fisher!). The origins in Fisher were later refined by Basu, who relied on ideas of Bayesian 
inference to close any gaps. This is where our review begins. 
1.1. The Seeds of Conditional Inference 
Many influential ideas in statistical inference can be attributed to Sir Ronald Fisher. 
One of the most elusive, perhaps, is that of conditional inference. In Fisher (1959) we find 
the ideas of a reference set: 
"In attempting to identify a test of significance · · · with a test for acceptance, one 
of the deepest dissimilarities lies in the population, or reference set, available for 
making statements of probability." 
Interpreting Fisher, we find that he is concerned with the range of the inferences, that 
is, with the set in the population to which the inference should apply. In this sense, he is 
concerned with conditional inference, inference conditional on some subset of the sample 
space. The exact nature of his concern is not, at first, clear. It does emerge in some later 
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statements, again from Fisher (1959). In talking of inference from Student's t distribution, 
he says 
"The reference set for which this probability statement holds is that of the values 
of p, x and s corresponding to the same sample · · · there is no possibility of 
recognizing any subset of cases · · · for which any different value of the 
probability should hold." (my italics) 
In this statement we see one of the keystones of conditional inference. There should not 
be a subset of the sample space (a recognizable subset) on which the inference from a 
procedure can be substantially altered. If such subsets exist, then inference from the 
procedure is suspect. 
If such a recognizable subset existed, then Fisher would no doubt find it, however, 
there does not seem to be any general methodology used. Although ideas of estimating and 
eliminating nuisance parameters are used, and also ideas of ancillarity are used, no general 
scheme is defined. 
One famous example is Fisher's criticism of Welch's solution to the Behrens-Fisher 
problem. If xi' sf, i=1,2, are the sample mean and variance from a sample of size n from 
independent normal population with unknown parameters J.Li and o-f, Fisher (1956) derived 
the following fact. Under the hypothesis H0 : p 1=p2 , for any value t, 
(1.1) 
where T 2(n-1) has Student's t distribution with 2(n-1) degrees of freedom, and T is an 
unknown parameter satisfying 0 ::; r ::; 1. In other words, conditional on Si=S~, the random 
variable ...rniXrX 2I/ ~Si+S~ is stochastically greater than IT 2(n-1)1· Fisher used this fact to 
show that Welch's solution suffered from the property that the probability of rejecting a true 
H0 , given that si=s~, was bounded below by the nominal level. Thus, on the recognizable 
subset {<si,s~): si=sn, Welch's solution has an actual error rate greater than the nominal 
level. 
This conditional behavior would be even more disturbing if the set { (si ,s~): si=sn 1s 
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taken as a reference set, i.e., a set on which the conditional inference should be applied. 
Fisher's argument for conditioning on this set, or more generally on the ratio si/s~, is elusive. 
The fact that Fisher considers this a reasonable reference set appears again in Fisher (1959), 
where he discusses his solution to the Behrens-Fisher problem. 
The fact remains, however, that the mechanism of choice of a reference set is elusive. 
Although concepts of ancillarity and elimination of nuisance parameters are considered, a 
general mechanism for choosing a conditional reference set is not known. 
1.2. Basu's Refinement 
In doing conditional, or post-data, inference the evidential meaning of the inference 
becomes increasingly important. Fisher's idea of a reference set has some meaning, i.e., it 
defines a part of the sample space on which inference it is meaningful to restrict inference. 
On the other hand, the connotation of a recognizable set does not carry this distinction. 
A recognizable set is only a set that is in the sample space, and may give no 
meaningful inference base. Poor conditional (post-data) performance of a procedure on a 
recognizable set is taken as criticism, but if this recognizable set is not a meaningful reference 
set, then the criticism may be vacuous. 
Fisher had the intuition to choose recognizable subsets that were also meaningful 
reference sets. Thus, when he leveled criticism (or praise) of the conditional performance of a 
procedure using a particular recognizable set, this set was also a meaningful reference set. 
One of the major clues left to us by Fisher, on how to chose these reference sets, is that they 
should use ancillary information. 
Alas, many of us are not possessed with Fisher's intuition in choosing reference sets. 
When Basu started to think about this, he realized that basing conditioning sets on ancillary 
information was not, in itself, a reasonable 
technique in general. In Basu (1964), he says 
"The ancillary argument of Fisher cannot be extended · · ·. We end this 
discourse with an example where · · · the ancillary argument leads us to a 
rather curious and totally unacceptable 'reference set'." 
-6-
Basu then gives an example to illustrate his point. The point that we should be concerned 
with is that the choice of the reference set is not automatic. Of course, Basu does not give us 
a recipe for choosing a reference set, but rather argues that the only reasonable procedures 
are free of conditional defects. 
1.3. Conditional and Unconditional Inference 
Inference made conditional on the data must, necessarily, connect a statement about 
the unknown parameters to the data actually observed. This fact separates conditional 
inference from unconditional, or pre-data, inference. This latter inference, that of the 
frequentist (Neyman-Pearson) school, need not apply in any way, to the data at hand. A 
frequentist inference merely states how the procedure will perform in repeated trials, even if 
such a statement is ludicrous in the face of the observed data. 
This dichotomy, between conditional and unconditional inference, most often results in 
a statistician choosing one stand and rejecting the other. Fisher rejected unconditional 
inference in favor of conditional. Basu, although starting out in the Newman-Pearson camp, 
ultimately rejected unconditional inference in favor of Bayesian conditional inference. Indeed, 
perhaps Basu stated his belief most elegantly in Basu (1981) 
"With Ex as the (Neyman-Pearson) confidence set corresponding to the 
observed sample x, can any evidential meaning be attached to the assertion () 
f Ex? Suppose on the basis of sample X one can construct a 95% confidence 
interval estimator for the parameter (), then does it mean that (the random 
variable) X has information on () in some sense?" 
Of course, Basu gave examples of 95% Neyman-Pearson confidence intervals with no 
information at all about B. For example, if() f [0,1], and X "" U(0,1) (X is B-free), then for 
any fixed set B C (0,1), the set 
i B if 0 < X < .05 Ex = (0,1) if .05 <X< .95 
Be if .95 ~ X < 1 
is a 95% unconditional confidence set for B. But, of course, we cannot attach any evidential 
meaning to the statement "() f Ex." (We note, in passing, that the conditional behavior of 
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this set is wretched. For example, P((J f ExiO < X ~ .05) = P(O f B) and P((J f Exl·95 ~X < 
1) = P((J f Be). One of these two probabilities must be smaller than .95. Further, 
P((J f Exi·05 <X< .95) = 1, showing that the post-data inference can be moved all over.) 
As we trace the development of conditional inference, we will see that Basu 's teachings 
are there. Many papers take the approach of verifying good conditional properties by 
verifying Bayesianity. However, this might be a case where some good can come out of 
greed. Why should we be satisfied with only good post-data behavior or good pre-data 
behavior? Why can't we try for both? The answer is that we can not only try for both, we 
can sometimes attain it. The procedures that do can be acclaimed by both camps -
conditional and unconditional. 
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2. Formalizing Conditional Inference 
The work of Buehler (1959) was a landmark attempt in examining post-data validity of 
Neyman-Pearson procedures. Buehler's work is pioneering for two reasons. One, he 
examined post-data behavior of frequency based rules (not necessarily Bayes rules) and two, 
he developed criteria for carrying out this evaluation in an objective manner. Buehler's work 
was based on other seminal ideas of Tukey (1958) and Stein (1961), and was ultimately 
generalized and formalized by Robinson (1979a,b). We briefly describe Robinson's set-up. 
The random variable X has density f(xiB) and, based on observing X=x, a confidence 
procedure <C(x),'Y(x)> is constructed. A confidence procedure consists of a set C(x) and a 
probability assertion 'Y(x). The validity of 'Y(x) as a confidence assertion is measured by the 
ability of <(C(x),'Y(x)> to maintain its confidence even when evaluated conditionally. To be 
specific, we consider 'Y(x) to be an evaluation of the coverage properties of C(x) in the sense 
that 
(2.1) 
Suppose now that a recognizable subset, .A, of the sample space, and an t > 0 exists such 
that 
(2.2) VB 
Then, we have qualitatively changed the confidence behavior. On the set .A, our conditional 
assertion is suspect: The asserted probability, 'Y(x), is, on the average, uniformly greater 
than the actual conditional coverage. 
In Robinson's terminology, (2.2) is a special case of a relevant betting function, defined 
as follows: 
Definition 2.1: A function k(x), -1 ~ k(x) ~ 1 is relevant for <C(x),'Y(x)> if 
(2.3) 
for all B and some t > 0. If t=O k(x) is semirelevant. 
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For statistical purposes, the most interesting forms of functions k(x) are indicator 
functions. Such functions reduce (2.3) to forms like (2.2), and allow interpretations in terms 
of conditional coverage probabilities. If k(x) < 0 is relevant, it is called negatively biased. If 
k(x) = -I(XcA.) then (2.3) would reduce to (2.2). Positively-biased sets can similarly be 
defined. In the previously mentioned criticism by Fisher of Welch's solution to the Behrens-
Fisher problem, Fisher identified a negatively-biased relevant subset. 
Buehler and Fedderson (1963) identify, in a special case, a positively-biased relevant 
subset for the one-sample t interval (they also attribute a similar results to Stein (1961) -
Oh! to have a copy!). Later, Brown (1967) generalized this result to any one-sample t 
interval. For a random sample X 1,· ··,Xn from n(JL,o- 2), Brown identified constants k and f. so 
that 
(2.4) 
where t is the cutoff yielding a nominal 1-a interval. This can be interpreted as saying that 
the conditional coverage of the t interval, after accepting H0 :jt=0, is uniformly greater than 
the nominal level. 
Identification of semirelevant subsets is less interesting than identification of relevant 
subsets, as most procedures with a frequentist guarantee will allow them. For example, from 
(2.4) we can deduce 
(2.5) 
identifying a negatively-biased semirelevant set for the t interval. However, Robinson (1976) 
showed that the t interval allows no negatively biased relevant sets. This led him to conclude 
that elimination of negatively-biased semirelevant sets was too strong a conditional criterion, 
but elimination of negatively- biased relevant sets was about right. (The elimination of 
positively biased sets is not of major concern, as this corresponds to being conservative.) 
An interesting set of papers are those by Olshen (1973), and Sheffe (1977) with a 
rejoinder by Olshen (1977). In the 1973 paper, Olshen established a result like (2.5) for the 
Sheffe multiple comparisons procedure. Specifically, Olshen showed that the conditional 
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coverage of the Sheffe procedure, given that the ANOV A F test rejects H0 , is less than or 
equal to the nominal level. Thus, Olshen generalized Brown (1967) in one direction, 
identifying a negatively biased semirelevant set for the Sheffe intervals. Sheffe took exception 
to this criticism, and answers Olshen in the 1977 article. 
The connection between Bayes sets and conditional performance is very strong, as 
shown by Pierce (1973) and Robinson (1979a). If 1r(B) is a proper prior, and we define 
(2.6) 
where 1r(Bix) 
"Y1f'(x) = J 1r(Bix)dB, 
C1f'(x) 
f(xl8)7r(B)/ Jf(xiB)7r(B)dB, then no semirelevant functions exist for 
<C1f'(x),"Y1f'(x)>. Thus, proper Bayes procedures have the strongest possible conditional 
properties. 
Although the connection between Bayesianity and conditional performance is very 
strong, the exact link has not yet been established. That is, necessary and sufficient 
conditions for elimination of relevant, or semirelevant, functions have not yet been 
established. Although the work of Pierce and Robinson, and also Bondar (1977), establishes 
links between (possibly improper) Bayes procedures and nonexistence of relevant sets, the 
ultimate theorem, giving a necessary and sufficient condition, is still not known. It seems 
that the answer, although still unproven due to mathematical technicalities, is that 
elimination of relevant functions will occur if, and only if, the procedure is a limit of Bayes 
rules. This, however, remains an open question in the conditional inference literature. 
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3. Frequentist Conditional Inference 
Although proper Bayes rules have strong conditional properties they do not, in general, 
have good frequentist properties. However, limits of Bayes rules, or generalized Bayes rules, 
can have good frequentist properties. Furthermore, such procedures may also have 
acceptable conditional properties. It is within this class that we can find procedures that 
have acceptable frequentist (or pre-data) properties and acceptable conditional (or post-data) 
properties. 
A confidence set, C(x), is a 1-a frequentist confidence procedure for a parameter 0 if 
(3.1) for all 0 , 
that is, the unconditional coverage probability of C(x) is at least 1-a. Of course, this pre-
data guarantee says nothing of the conditional performance of the procedure <C(x),1-a>. 
Robinson was able to establish conditional properties for a number of frequentist procedures 
by using the fact that they are limits of Bayes rules. In particular, his results for the t-
interval (Robinson, 1979b) rely on this fact. Other results (Robinson, 1979b) for frequentist 
intervals for location or scale families also use arguments based on limiting Bayesianity. 
Most conditional properties of limits of Bayes rules deal with relevant, rather than 
semirelevant, functions as to the existence off > 0 becomes important in the limit. However, 
for certain procedures from location families, Robinson (1979b) established the nonexistence 
of semirelevant functions. In particular, if X "'f(x-0), then the procedure 
<[x-c,x+c], 1-a> , 
(3.2) 
1-a = J f(t)dt , 
-c 
IS a 1-a frequentist confidence procedure that allows no semirelevant functions. Using 
different arguments based on invariance, Bondar (1977) established conditional properties of 
invariant frequentist sets. 
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The issue that is at the heart of the frequentist/conditional dichotomy is the 
assignment of a confidence function to a set C(x). For example, for any set C(x), where X ,..., 
f(xjO), if we define 'Y(x) by 
I f(xi0)7r(O)d0 
(3.3) 'Y(x) = C(x) , I f(xj0)7r(O)d0 
e 
where 1r(O) is a proper prior, then the procedure <C(x),,(x)> is free of semirelevant sets. 
However, if C(x) is also a 1-o: frequentist confidence procedure, this argument does not imply 
any conditional properties of <C(x),1-o:>. Thus, this type of consideration leads to two 
questions: 
i) Is <C(x),'Y(x)> a reasonable frequentist procedure? 
(3.4) 
ii) Is <C(x),1-o:> a reasonable conditional procedure? 
Since the work of Robinson, and the others, in the 1970s there has been some progress 
made on the questions in (3.4). In Casella (1987) it was argued that, with some regularity 
conditions, a sufficient condition for the frequentist procedure <C(x),1-o:> to be conditionally 
acceptable is the existence of a (possibly improper) prior 1r(O) such that 
(3.5) 
f f( xj0)1r( O)dO 
'Y(x) = C(x) ~ 1-o: 
f f(xl0)7r(O)d0 
e 
for all x . 
If (3.5) is satisfied, then the procedure <C(x),l-o:> allows no negatively biased relevant sets, 
which is acceptable conditional performance. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that such a 
property held for the multivariate normal confidence set centered at the positive-part James-
Stein estimator. Specifically, if X ,..., N(O,I), a p-variate normal random variable (p ~ 3), then 
the confidence procedure <C8(x),1-o:> allows no negatively-biased relevant sets, where 
(3.5) 
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c 0(x) = { 0: jO-o(x)j ~ c }. o(x) = (1 - p-;)+ x , lXI 
P( X~ ~ c) = 1-a . 
Such a conditional inference strategy was also promoted in Casella (1988), and a 
number of other procedures were also examined. In discussing this paper, a number of 
alternate strategies were put forth. For example, Berger (1988) advocates an "estimated 
confidence" approach, where the procedure <C(x),-y(x)> would be considered frequency valid 
if 
(3.6) E0-y(x) ~ P 0(o f C(x) ), for all 0 , 
i.e., on the average, the confidence assertion is conservative. Berger and Lu (1987) have 
applied these ideas to Stein-type problems. Most recently, Brown and Hwang (1989) have 
shown that for the confidence set [x-c,x+c], where X=x is an observation from f(x-0), the 
confidence procedure <[x-c,x+c],1-a> is admissible, where 1-o: = Jc f(t)dt. The admissibility 
-c 
is with respect to the class of confidence procedures <[x-c,x+c],-y(x)> (fixed c), where -y(x) 
satisfies E0-y(x) ~ 1-a (frequentist validity) and the loss function is Lc( 0,-y(x)) = ( -y(x) -
I(BE[x-c,x+c]) ) 2• 
Another alternate strategy was described by Lindsay (1988), who suggested attaching 
both a frequentist and conditional confidence to a given set C(x). Although this is a sensible 
approach, it is probably the case tpat practitioners are more comfortable with one number for 
a confidence assertion. Thus, this reasonable solution might not find acceptability in 
practice. 
Returning to the questions posed in (3.4), we might now ask what is the reasonable 
requirement for the confidence assertion to be attached to C(x). Taking into account the 
theories of relevant sets, and the manner in which confidence sets are used by practitioners, 
the following strategy seems most reasonable. For a set C(x), assert confidence -y(x) where 
-y(x) satisfies (3.3) for some (possibly improper) prior 1r(O). This strategy assures us that 
<C(x),-y(x)> is conditionally acceptable. But, moreover, we require that -y(x) be valid as a 
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measure of frequentist confidence. Ideally, we would require that ;(x) satisfy (3.5), which 
not only renders <C(x),;(x)> frequency valid, but also yields the conditional acceptability of 
<C(x),1-a>. However, condition (3.5) may not always be attainable and, in such a case, we 
would settle for ;(x) satisfying something like (3.6). This would give some frequentist 
acceptability to the procedure <C(x),;(x)>. 
These ideas have been investigated, in different forms, by Maatta and Casella (1987), 
Casella and Maatta (1988), Goutis (1989) for estimating a normal variance, and Hwang and 
Casella (1988) for estimation of a normal mean. 
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4. Discussion 
The ideas behind conditional inference are deep, and here we have superficially 
sketched one line of work stemming from the developments of Fisher and Basu. There are 
many ideas in their work, both implicit and explicit, that haven't been mentioned. (For 
example, Basu is an advocate of the Likelihood Principle, and recent work by Casella and 
Robert (1988) suggest that violation of this principle immediately leads to the existence of 
relevant sets.) However, it is clear that the ideas of conditional inference play an important 
role in statistics. 
Although it might be argued that searching for relevant sets is an occupation only for 
the theoretical statistician, we must remember that practitioners are going to make 
conditional (post-data) inferences. Thus, we must be able to assure the user that any 
inference made, either pre-data or post-data, possesses some definite measure of validity. 
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